

TAB

TAB B

Departmental Action Failure in Support of CIA

I. Failure to Fulfill CIA Requirements for Intelligence Information

1. In general, CRE has always experienced difficulty in obtaining prompt, and adequate IAC collection action on requirements for intelligence information. The problems that CIA faces regarding requirements to the IAC agencies vary in each agency in nature, subject, and complexity, but all seem to stem from an unwillingness on the part of the agencies to recognize CIA's intelligence mission and its concurrent need for foreign intelligence information. Furthermore, CIA has no workable legal means by which it may press or enforce its requests upon the IAC agencies, know if its requests are being acted upon, or in what priority they are considered. In most cases, when the IAC agencies do transmit CIA requirements to the field for action, the prior delay in departmental offices (especially in the Department of State) makes the requests outdated even before they reach the field.

a. Although this tendency to protect position and prestige for the Department is a natural and important factor and should perhaps not be construed as lack of cooperation, it is nevertheless true that CIA, relying as it must upon the Department of State for the great bulk of its intelligence information, finds itself helplessly blocked by such restrictive objections to its legitimate and necessary requests for fresh and timely information from the field.

b. Even if the Foreign Service could be persuaded or reorganized to the point where it might be relied upon to be responsive to requests for intelligence information, there would still be the problem of setting the gears in motion. Presumably because of the many Foreign Service protests registered in the past, State has devised an elaborate system of clearances which must first be gone through before a CIA request for field collection may be flashed to a foreign post. This involves clearance through both the research and the political desks, as well as any other interested components of the department. As a result, anyone in either ARA or DRA or MD, may, for example, effectually veto an ORE request for information on arms traffic in Latin America. Under these circumstances, an extremely urgent request with top priority may, under favorable circumstances press through IAD for action in a week, as for instance, our Requirement Directive 6066, which was of interest to the topmost policy levels. Under less favorable circumstances, and in the absence of a single key man in OIR, the request might be indefinitely delayed. A common practice in State when such a report comes through is to reply that OIR feels the information in the files adequately covers

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the situation, even though the CIA desk is fully aware of that same information and has clearly indicated that field action is needed. This spins out into a long-distance altercation between the desks of CIA and OIR which may usually be relied on to delay the request well beyond the point where the information may be of use. The situation verges on the ridiculous occasionally, when the CIA desk discovers discrepancies in the Foreign Service reporting and requests clarification from the field. OIR replies that the discrepancy has been noted, but that it cannot imagine how to reconcile the reported data without going to the field, precisely what CIA asked in the first place. In the meantime, several weeks have passed. This was the case in RD 6129 on Yugoslav crude oil production.

c. ORE has had indications in the past that there is a lack of coordination in State between IAD (Intelligence and Acquisition) and the Foreign Service that sometimes hampers the processing of requirements. In one case, ORE was refused a requirement by IAD for a field study on a foreign political situation on the grounds that the foreign service personnel at the post were inexperienced. Strangely enough, ORE's requirement was based upon a similar study accomplished on the same subject and in the same country. The only difference being that a different portion of the country was involved. (See case #9, under TAB B)

2. ORE's problems in negotiating requirements with the Defense Agencies all centered mainly with the Department of the Army and within this agency mainly on the withholding of information. Probably the greatest problem stems from the old fiction of information received by Army being "operational" in character and thus not of valid interest to CIA. Of course this determination is made in every case by the Army with CIA unable to review the material. For months ORE has received little or no information from SCAP, even when conditions in the Far East were at the most critical period in modern history. On the Western Europe area, ORE has received very spotty information on the Western Zone of Germany, while reporting from zones where US collecting organizations were in considerably more difficult circumstances were considered adequate.

3. Review of past requests by ORE upon IAC collection facilities reveals quite clearly that the IAC agencies cooperate with CIA in collection matters only insofar as the requested action happens to coincide with their own primary interests and responsibilities for intelligence production. Within the area of overlapping interests between this Agency and the IAC, fairly good results may be achieved. Outside such overlap, little can be accomplished. An aggravated case of this persistent difficulty is presented by the request made by ORE upon Army for verification and amplification of data on Soviet and Satellite manufacturing facilities, which had ultimately to be abandoned because of the low priority assigned by Army to such information as compared with higher priority topics, such as identification and description of ordnance.

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4. Typical examples of departmental failure to collect the information needed by CIA are cited in Cases #1 through 6 (under TAB B).

5. An analysis of requests for information sent to the Department of State during a sample six month period in 1948 and 1949 indicates that twenty-five percent were not even transmitted to the field for action and that the remainder were held in the department an average of twenty-five days before being forwarded to the field for collection. Only about one-fourth of CIA's requests to the Department of State received an adequate response. These statistics are presented as Case #7 (under TAB B).

6. In many instances the Department of State finds it "unnecessary" or purposeless to comply with CIA requests for field action. Cases #8 through #11 are examples of this censorship of CIA requirements.

II. Failure to Make Available, to CIA, Information of Value for Intelligence Purposes

1. CIA receives regularly the bulk of the regular flow of information to the Departments from the field. There are certain exceptions, however, that generally involve the most important subjects or areas. A large number of important messages from the field are treated as "eyes only" messages and are not sent to CIA regardless of their intelligence value. Messages from [REDACTED] and Korea have in general been withheld on the basis, yet no accurate estimate of the situation in any of these areas can be made without access to this traffic. Another frequent practice is for an IAC agency to treat a new and important subject, such as the North Atlantic Pact, as a special security problem and to handle messages pertaining to the subject out of channels. This makes it difficult for CIA to learn of the existence of the messages in the first place and leaves a big gap in our files if the restriction is eventually overcome. Intentional or not, this is a most effective way of limiting the accuracy and effectiveness of CIA estimates.

2. One attitude frequently encountered among IAC officials is that information will be furnished to CIA on specific request, but that knowledge of the existence of the information will be closely guarded, making it difficult for CIA to make the request. Cases 12, 13, and 16 (under TAB B) furnish evidence of this attitude.

III. Failure to Provide Departmental Intelligence to CIA

1. The preparation of national intelligence estimates, purporting to utilize Departmental intelligence is an impossible task unless the Estimator has a thorough knowledge of the thinking of the various departments on both short and long-range situations and complete access to the departmental intelligence products. While ORE is not in as good a position to document this point as it OCD, nearly every component of ORE has discovered through opposite number contact that the other agencies are producing material that never comes to CIA.

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2. In many cases, the most important work done by the IAC agencies is in answer to special requests from within their own departments or by other departments. This type of study is rarely sent to CIA. In fact, CIA is rarely informed of the existence of specific studies, but knows of the situation largely as a result of statements from IAC personnel and from personal observation of CIA personnel on temporary duty with or visiting the IAC agencies. A typical statement from a key member of ORE is quoted in illustration in Case #16 (under TAB B).

3. Most attempts by CIA to comply with the NSCID provision that CIA should use Departmental Intelligence in National Intelligence Estimates have been negotiated informally with opposite numbers in the various departments. Experience has proved that the Departments do not readily cooperate in matters of concern to CIA. Examples of CIA efforts are given in Cases #14 and #15 (under TAB B).

IV. Failure to Advise CIA on Intelligence Research and Production, Projected, in Process and Completed.

1. NSCID #3 specifically provides that each agency "exchange information on projects and plans for the production of Staff Intelligence."

2. There can be no efficient planning of production in ORE until we know what the other agencies are also doing. CIA can never do its job of coordinating the production of the IAC agencies until we are continuously informed of what they are doing. There have been many attempts, most informal but some formal, to obtain this information. X

3. The following is the status of notification by the four main IAC agencies:

a. State: ORE receives the "Monthly Survey of Intelligence Research in Progress and Completed", which covers materials in process during a single calendar month. We generally receive this at least two weeks after the end of the month which it covers. Its principal inadequacy, besides this delay, is that it covers only a relatively small portion of the projects undertaken by OIR.

b. Army: Until October 1948, ORE received a listing of "Projects in the Mill" on the first of each month. Since 1 October 1948 we have received no notification of Army projects.

c. Navy: ORE receives no listing of ONI projects, either in progress or as completed.

d. Air: Until May 1948, ORE received a monthly list of "Studies Completed by the Air Intelligence Division". Since 10 May we have received no further listings from Air.

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4. In contrast to the above, CIA sends to each of these agencies a copy of the monthly ORE Status Report, which shows projects completed, projects in reproduction, projects undergoing coordination, projects under review, projects in draft form, etc. This explicit report on ORE projects should be of substantial benefit to the other agencies.

5. Case #16, TAB B, is further evidence in support of the foregoing.

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CASE #1

RD #6529 - ORE Originated, 30 May 1949

This requirement requested five topics of information on [REDACTED] political parties in order that estimates concerning forthcoming elections could be made by CIA.

25X6

ORE REQUIREMENTS DIVISION LOGS INDICATE THE
FOLLOWING SUSPENSE CHECKS

10 June : OCD requested 10 day extension of deadline - extension granted - established for 24 June

30 June : In view of an estimate produced, OCD checked to see if points 1, 2, and 5, were still requested. Answered yes

1 July : Checked about deadline with OCD. OCD remarked that Army representative stated they "had dropped the ball". A cable supposed to go out 30 June. New suspense set for 15 July

15 July : Check for status - suspense set for 29 July

26 July : Cable from [REDACTED] in response to RD. OCD requests ORE comment on adequacy. New suspense 3 August

27 July : Branch remarks that only one of five points covered anywhere near adequately

8 Aug : Told OCD to see if anything exists over and above cable New suspense 12 August

30 Aug : Elections passed - told to close out requirement

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CASE #2

RD #6437 - ORE Originated, 11 May 1949

On 11 May ORE originated a request (RD 6437) for the latest available totals for certain specific items in the Turkish budgets for 1946, 1947, and 1948. ORE indicated that all available sources in Washington had been exploited.

ORE REQUIREMENTS DIVISION LOGS INDICATE THE
FOLLOWING SUSPENSE CHECKS

- 3 June : State memorandum cited field reports received in Wash. that gave totals requested. Memorandum also referred requester to ORE report (The information had been requested in order to bring that particular report up to date and to eliminate discrepancies appearing in the other field reports cited by State)
- 10 June : ORE memorandum to OCD described particular discrepancies appearing in available reports and indicated the Turkish agency that has such information.
- 6 July : Partial reply from State
- 15 Aug : State airgram states report being forwarded
- 26 Aug : State despatch received giving fairly complete information
- 8 Sept : ORE originated new requirements to clarify inconsistency
- 24 Sept : Cable sent to field

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TAB B

CASE #3

RD #6136 - Originated ORE, 10 December 1948:

This requirement requested the text of a speech made by prominent Spanish national at a Spanish University, on 7 December 1948.

The Department of State notified CIA on 23 March 1949 that the speech was being printed and would be sent to Washington within two weeks.

ORE REQUIREMENTS DIVISION LOGS INDICATE THE
FOLLOWING SUSPENSE CHECKS

- 7 June: Asked State to check with field personnel - suspense established for 15 June
- 16 June: OCD asked to check with State - suspense established for 21 June
- 21 June: State checked again, follow-up drafted to field - suspense established for 28 June
- 27 June: The follow-up of 21 June still in process of going out
- 30 June: Another State check, believe that follow-up has gone out-suspense established for 15 July
- 12 July: Information received that the State follow-up has gone out - suspense established for 29 July
- 5 Aug : ORE checked to see if anything received
- 16 Aug : Another check to see if anything received - State refuses to send another follow-up to field
- 31 Aug : Check with OCD, decided in view of no action to close as failure. Closed this date.

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CASE #11

RD #6538 - ORE Originated, 30 May 1949

This requirement requested a complete list of the officials of three

ORE REQUIREMENTS DIVISION LOGS INDICATE THE
FOLLOWING SUSPENSE CHECKS

8 July 1949 : ORE received on 8 July 1949 a State Department memorandum dated 1 July 1949, which purported to satisfy the collection directive served on State by OCD. The former had failed to take requested field action.

8-19 July : Reviewed State reply within ORE and with OCD. This review revealed that a complete list of the officials of [REDACTED] could be found in a current issue of [REDACTED] an overt foreign publication.

19 July : Memo written to OCD, citing information in [REDACTED] and requesting State be again asked to take field action on [REDACTED] 25X6

5 Aug : ORE checked to see if any action by State

10 Aug : ORE notified by OCD that State was sending informal memo to field

17 Aug : OCD reported, after check, that above memo actually dispatched

9 Sept. : ORE received State Department memorandum, dated 30 August 1949, which contained information on [REDACTED] 25X6
Identical with that in original July memo. Information deemed incomplete.

10-19 Sept : Reviewed State reply within ORE and with OCD. Memo written on 19 September '49 to OCD, citing more complete information already in ORE files, and again requesting State field action

CASE #5

15 July 1949

C-O-P-Y

Secret

Assistant Director, OCD

Assistant Director, ORE

Delay in Reporting on [REDACTED] 25X6

25X6

1. An extremely serious financial problem, affecting the security of the US, has been confronting the [REDACTED] for the past several weeks.

25X6

2. On 14 June 1949, this office requested information on economic conditions in [REDACTED] (RD 6565) because of the unsatisfactory reporting on that area.

3. The first indications of the seriousness and urgency of this situation reached ORE via an FBIB news release of 8 July 1949 and a New York Times [REDACTED] dispatch dated 9 July 1949. It was on the basis of this incomplete and officially unconfirmed information that the Western Europe Branch was obliged to prepare estimates of the situation (Daily Estimate of 12 July and Weekly Estimate of 13 July 1949).

25X6

4. The first official report on this subject was Department of State Cable Number 1107, dated 13 July 1949 and received by the Western Europe Branch of my office at 4:30 p.m. on 13 July. This cable contained an almost complete account of the emergency and of the events which led up to it over a period of six weeks, and supplies partial official confirmation from the field.

5. In view of the foregoing, I find it necessary to protest emphatically against the inexplicable delay involved in reporting an emergency of such magnitude and hereby recommend that reporting on this subject be expedited forthwith.

S/ THEODORE BABBITT

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CASE #6

RD #6218 - ORE originated - 31 January 1949

25X6

25X6

On 31 January 1949, ORE originated a request asking the American Legation in Berne to obtain reports of a meeting between the [REDACTED] political counselor. The request included views expressed and particular points covered by participants. The requirement was sent to State, Army, and OSC.

ORE REQUIREMENTS DIVISION LOGS INDICATE THE
FOLLOWING SUSPENSE CHECKS

- 1 March : Army answered with ID views on military items
- 10 March : State Department sent request to the field. No reply received to date
- 26 April : SO responded with a complete but untimely report

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CASE #7

An analysis of a six month sample of requests made by CIA on the Department of State for collection action in late 1948 and early 1949 reveals the following situation:

- a. Approximately 25% of CIA requests to State are not transmitted to the field.
- b. The average delay by State in sending the remainder of the requests to the field is 25 days.
- c. 28% of CIA requests to State result in some sort of specific response from the field.
- d. In addition to "c", approximately 47% of CIA requests are sent to the field but do not affect the normal spontaneous reporting from the field.
- e. Even when a report is prepared in direct response to a CIA request it is frequently inadequate and can not be clarified or enlarged upon without going through the same time-consuming procedure.

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2 May 1949

CASE #8

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C O P Y

TO : Assistant Director, OCD
Central Intelligence Agency
FROM : Chief, Acquisition and Distribution
Division, Department of State
SUBJECT: CD 6260

After careful consideration by the cognizant Research and Political Divisions of the Department it was decided that a special instruction on this subject to the missions was unnecessary. It was felt that in view of present reporting from Montevideo on the activities of Argentine exiles, particularly with reference to the Junta for the Defense of Democracy and on the ILO Conference, it can be expected that this material will be provided in the normal course of reporting.

OLI:IAD:RHIngersoll:rr

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CASE #9

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1949

TO: : Assistant Director, OCD
Central Intelligence Agency

FROM : Chief, Acquisition and Distribution
Division, Department of State

SUBJECT: CD 6323.1

It is the opinion of the Division of Southwest European Affairs that the preparation of the report request in CD 6323.1 is beyond the capabilities of the present staff in Spain. All members of the cognizant mission are newly assigned and lack the experience and background necessary to prepare such a report.

Under the circumstances it is felt that it would be to no purpose to send this request to the field.

/s/ Philip G. Strong

OLI:IAD:RHingersoll:rr

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CASE # 10

TAB B

30 August 1949

TO : Assistant Director, OCD
Central Intelligence Agency

FROM : Chief, Acquisition and Distribution
Division, Department of State

SUBJECT: CD No. 6618.1

The Embassy at Prague has followed closely the reorganization of the Czech economic administration and its relationship with the Soviet Union and the Satellite countries, but the Department has received no information which might substantiate the CIA report with regard to the establishment in Czechoslovakia of a Western European Branch of the "Economic Office", an agency of Soviet economic warfare. The Department believes that if such an organization had in fact been established, this would have been reported by reliable sources.

It is not contemplated that field action will be taken in this case.

OLI:IAD:JStilton:rr

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CASE # 11

21 December 1949

Assistant Director, OCD, Central
Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief, Acquisition and Distribution
Division, Department of State
GD 6120.1

The Department of State regrets that it is unable to supply the information requested, but, at the same time, does not believe any purpose would be served by referring the inquiry to the field.

The Embassy in Paris is somewhat handicapped in any attempt to secure information on this subject because of reluctance to evince any official interest in the RPF or de Gaulle. Members of the Department who have, however, attempted to obtain information of the kind requested, have been repeatedly unsuccessful and have come to hold the opinion that this information simply does not exist. Under the circumstances it is believed that current reporting is as nearly adequate as can be expected.

OLI:IAD:RHIngersoll:fd

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CASE #12

The following is from the files of the Western European branch:

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"Col. Ahalt of Staff Communications in the Dept. of Army, informed [REDACTED] of IC/ORE, that there were very few Telecons coming through and that CIA always receives a copy unless there is a limited distribution, in which case if CIA finds out it exists, they may request it and the Army will be only too glad to loan it to CIA."

One of the safest and most effective ways of sabotaging CIA is to delay, under one pretext or another, the fulfillment of CIA's needs. CIA cannot be expected to maintain an espionage system among the IAC agencies in order to discover the information that it needs in order to do its job.

It might be added that the Colonel's statement (that there are very few telecons) does not accord with the testimony of CIA personnel who have participated in telecons themselves or have learned about them through other channels.

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CASE # 13

EXAMPLE OF DEFICIENCY IN ROUTINE REPORTING FROM THE FIELD

25X6 On 6 May 1949, ORE requested, via RD #6419, that it desired two copies of a report prepared on [REDACTED] Merchant Marine by an official of the Maritime Service. Upon investigation by OCD it developed that the Maritime Service knew of a report prepared by SCAP, that was, in the opinion of the Maritime Service, a much more complete and thorough report than the one prepared by their official.

It is ORE's opinion that this type of information should be included in routine dissemination to the Central Intelligence Agency. If ORE had not received knowledge of this report by chance, there could have well been considerable duplication had ORE undertaken a research project on this topic.

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CASE # 14

On 15 April 1948 CIA requested research support from the Army and the Air Force on a study of the French armed forces. This was a matter within the jurisdiction of those agencies and appropriate for "farming out" to them by CIA. Both agencies replied that they felt that this request should have been made to the JIG instead. The JIG in turn indicated that its mission was to serve the Joint Chiefs and that CIA should not request the JIG for such help.

Partial assistance was eventually received from the Army. Inasmuch as the final reply from Army was Top Secret, it will not be reproduced here. Other pertinent documents are attached.

Enclosures (4)

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CASE # 14 - Enclosure 1

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

15 April 1948

SUBJECT: Intelligence Request

ENCLOSURE: Outline for a Composite Study of the Armament and
Equipment status of the French Armed Forces

1. CIA contemplates making a composite study of the armament and equipment status of the French armed forces. The proposed scope of the study is indicated in the Enclosure hereto which is offered as a check-list that might be helpful to the departments concerned in preparing the desired material.

2. In the preparation of this composite study, it would be most helpful if the assistance of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force could be obtained.

3. It would be appreciated if each concerned department would prepare material for the part of the outline appropriate to its field and return its findings to this office not later than Friday, 30 April 1948.

S/ THEODOR BABBITT
Assistant Director
Reports and Estimates

CASE # 14 - Enclosure 2

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DDM-12
29 April 1948

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MEMORANDUM FOR [REDACTED]

CIA Liaison Officer

Subject: Basic Material for a Composite Study of the Armament
and Equipment Status of the French armed Forces

References: a. Your Memo of 27 April
b. CIA Memo of 15 April
c. Air Intelligence Div., Memo, 23 April
d. D/I Memo dated 23 April

The Joint Intelligence Group does not believe that CIA should request the JIG for the material needed by the CIA in the preparation of this study inasmuch as the JIG, as a part of the Joint Staff, is set up primarily to serve the needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their subordinate agencies, and hence, does not concur in the replies contained in references c and d.

S/ W. E. TODD, USAF
Major General, Joint Intelligence Group
The Joint Staff

cc: with copies of ref.
a, c and d to:
D/I, USAF
D/I, GSUSA
Chief of Naval Intel.

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CASE # 14 - Enclosure 3

CSGID 907

23 April 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Armed Forces Intelligence

1. Reference CIA request for intelligence on "...Armament and Equipment Status of the French Armed Forces" from ORE, dated 15 April 1948 (attached as Incl 1).

2. The subject CIA request indicates that CIA is undertaking a study that is of dominant interest to, and totally within the purview of, the Armed Forces. In the opinion of this office, intelligence of this type should be prepared, in final form, by the Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Staff.

1 Incl
Memo as stated
in par. 1 above w/incl

S/ CARTER W. CLARKE,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Deputy Director of Intelligence

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CASE #114 - Enclosure 4

23 April 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Attention: Mr. Theodore Babbitt, Assistant Director
Reports and Estimates

SUBJECT: Intelligence Request

1. Reference your memorandum dated 15 April 1948, requesting material to assist CIA in making a composite study of the armament and equipment status of the French armed forces, this request has been received and reviewed in the Directorate of Intelligence, Hq, USAF.

2. It appears from the outline inclosed with your memorandum that the study is in the field of primary interest and responsibility of the military services. It is believed that such a study should be acted upon by the Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a matter of their responsibility.

1 Incl
Cy memo frm CIA
dtd 15 Apr 48
w/Incl w/d

5/ JAMES F. OLIVE, JR.
Colonel, U.S.A.F.
Chief, Air Intelligence Division
DI/USAF Liaison Representative to
Office of Reports and Estimates, CIA

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CASE #15

The following statement was made by the Eastern Europe/USSR Branch.

"This Branch does not receive the various intelligence memoranda, projects, etc., prepared by the various IAC agencies and circulated only within the department of origin."

"A specific instance occurred recently when an analyst who had formally filed a collection requirement was advised that the desired information could be obtained from ID. The analyst called upon the Technical Section, Special Projects Group, ID. He observed reports in preparation and was informed that the study would be completed 1 September. ID stated that the report would not be available to CIA even though formally requested.

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28 September 1949

CASE # 16

25X1A

The following statement was made by [REDACTED] Chief of the Global Survey Group, who was chief of the Central Reports Staff when the CIG was first organized, later acting assistant director for ORE, and an active participant in high-level negotiations with the IAC agencies throughout the history of CIA. This background qualifies him to speak from personal experience on the subject of IAC cooperation.

"CIA has never been fully informed regarding the research and production being carried on in any of the IAC agencies. From the outset these agencies have quite openly declared that they would give us this information regarding work undertaken on their own initiative, but would withhold information regarding work done by request or direction, on the ground that knowledge of the latter category was a matter under the control of the requesting or directing authority rather than of themselves. Inasmuch as virtually all projects nowadays fall into the latter category, we are in effect denied access to all IAC intelligence production except that reported in routine periodicals and a few low-level OIR publications. A considerable volume of other production does exist: for example, I have seen in P&O a number of ID studies unknown to ORE (but not of such a nature as to justify their being withheld)."

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